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Abstract
Since opening its borders, the Czech Republic has tried to attract foreign investors in order to 
become more competitive. A system of investment incentives was created and has been adapted 
to meet changing conditions. As in many countries, there are positive and negative opinions on 
the existence of investment incentives. Many agencies are trying to determine whether they are 
effective or not. The aim of this article is to find out if the investment incentives provided in the 
Czech Republic have been effective not only for companies but for the government as a provider 
as well. To do so, it provides a case study of firms that received investment incentives, charting 
the firm’s development and profitability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Instrument of investment incentives have been around for over 100 years. In the 19th century 
they were used in the United States of America, in the 20th century governments around the 
world began to offer direct grants, tax breaks, training funds, free infrastructure and other in-
ducements to attract corporate investments. Moreover the well-known multinational companies 
take use of them. Investment incentives represent very large sums of government spendings and 
foregone revenue. 
Since March 2012, quantitative and qualitative studies were conducted under the project, “Effi-
ciency of Investment Incentives in the Czech Republic”, IGA/FaME/2012/014. The aim of this 
research is to find out whether the investment incentives are effective. The qualitative research 
is performed on 30 companies that were granted investment incentives in the Czech Republic 
from April 1998 to June 2011.  
2. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SIDES OF INVESTMENT  
    INCENTIVES
2.1 Definition of investment incentives
First of all, it is necessary to explain what investment incentives are. According to the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2003, p. 12) investment incentives 
are „measures designed to influence the size, location or industry of a foreign direct investment 
project by affecting its relative cost or by altering the risks attached to it through inducements 
that are not available to comparable domestic investors“. On the other hand, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 1996, p. 11) defines investment incentives 
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in general as “measurable advantages provided by government to particular companies or group 
of companies with a goal to force them to behave some way”. Thomas (2007, p. 11) describes 
investment incentives as “a subsidy given to affect the location of investment. The goal may be 
to attract new investment or to retain an existing facility”. 
2.2 Positive sides of investment incentives
Generally there are three opinions on investment incentives that should be considered as ben-
eficial. Their indisputable advantages are effective gains available from gains from taxes and 
benefits. Tiebout (1956) noticed the behavior of governments in terms of public goods and taxes. 
The key for this observation was the reaction of household on offered services and taxation. 
Households moved to the suburb according to their preferred mix. This reaction is similar with 
the behavior of foreign companies and assures effectiveness.  
Later, Black and Hoyt (1989) concluded that competing for investment can be effective when it 
moves governments to provide public services at marginal cost, rather than average cost. To do 
so, firms and governments should know the relevant investment costs at all locations. However 
this model addressed efficiency issues arising from the use of incentives and not equity ques-
tions. This resulted in opinion that location incentives are invested where the social benefit of 
the investment exceeds the private benefit of the investment. 
Bartik (1991) considered that in the market for investment, the jurisdictions with the greatest 
need as high unemployment will offer the largest location subsidies. However Fisher and Peters 
(1998) pointed out that in this field of investment incentives does not work as a theory that the 
redistribution of jobs from places of low unemployment to places of high unemployment. The 
advantage stays that they can offer more projects than poorer areas. 
Krugman (1994) represents strategic trade theory which counsels policy-makers facing a spe-
cific set of circumstances as increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. This was 
researched especially in the airliner filed but is not oriented toward achieving global efficien-
cy. Nevertheless this theory contributed to universal justification for incentives. According to 
UNCTAD (1996) financial incentives reduce the initial costs of the investment and lower the 
risk of the FDI project.
Srholec (2004) claims that it depends on governments reasons and if their influence is adequate 
to its costs and are important for decision and what they constitute for their investors. The basic 
arguments for support of FDI are the positive externalities which FDI are bringing. On the 
other hand investment incentives are deforming the investment decision because they are crowd-
ing out net supported investments and help to realize investments which would be profitable or 
are supporting investments realized even without government involvement. 
Dreyhaupt (2006) provided research that investment incentives can increase efficiency. Its con-
tribution can be seen in positive externalities or spillovers, making the social rate of return on 
the investment higher than the private rate of return on investment. According to this research 
incentives will increase a country’s welfare if the investment projects take place. However the 
problem is with the practical applicability of the model.  
Ginevičius and Šimelyte (2011) explored exogenous determinants of FDI. Two different models 
of FDI promotion were analyzed. The first one, the Irish model, refers to market liberalization 
and welcoming environment for FDI. However, the second one is more conservative, because 
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the Taiwan-Korean-Chinese (TKC) model has strict rules for foreign investment and pays at-
tention to cultural heritage and natural resources. Central and Eastern European countries be-
have conservatively and post-communist outlook is alive, the TKC model is more suitable for 
introducing FDI promotional policies. Deng, Falvey and Blake (2012) researched abolishing 
differential tax system in China and its reaction to FDI and spillovers in the short term. The 
result was restraining the foreign presence which is vital for FDI productivity spillovers. It en-
hances effectiveness of investment incentives. It leads to increasing the output level of domestic 
enterprises and promotes national welfare. In the result it can lift up the average productivity 
of all existing enterprises and raises the possibility of productivity spillovers and the absorptive 
capacity of domestic enterprises. 
2.3 Negative sides of investment incentives
There are critics arisen about the use of investment incentives. The first argument against them 
is that governments could cooperate with each other to reduce the use of incentives, but they 
find it difficult to do so because of their competition for investment. This wide opinion is called 
Prisoners´ Dilemma which sees a conflict between the individual incentives of local govern-
ments and what is collectively best for governments as a whole. Guisinger (1985) was the first to 
analyze location subsidies as a Prisoners´ Dilemma. 
Thomas (2000) thinks that from a national point of view, state or local incentives are often ir-
rational in the sense that the investment will be made somewhere in the country. Blomstrom, 
Kokko and Zejan (2000) are against incentives for three reasons; firstly because without invest-
ment incentives multinational corporations (MNc) might not enter the host economy; secondly, 
it is very difficult to make calculations about expected future benefits; and thirdly, foreign inves-
tors do not differ from the local investors. 
Most of them use arguments because they force governments to provide undesirably low levels 
of public services. Charlton (2003) pointed out that government will not have sufficient funds 
for important programs which could contribute to economic development such as education or 
infrastructure. He also noticed that keeping taxes low attracts business investments and local of-
ficials may hold spendings below optimal levels. On the other hand, Lynch (2004) is pessimistic 
and deems that state and local tax cuts paid by reducing public services can promote economic 
development and employment growth. Thomas (2007, p. 10) concluded that “investment incen-
tives are not a marginal or geographically-limited phenomenon. On every continent, multiple 
levels of governments use location subsidies to try to promote investments. While some coun-
tries run low-tax regimes with few, if any, incentives, they are the exception rather than the rule.” 
At the same time Thomas (2007) warns that investment incentives negatively affect efficiency, 
equity and the environment. 
There are theories about the localized factors. However, many scientists such as Morisset and 
Pirnia (2000) or Markusen (1998) conclude that the localized importance is ambiguous accord-
ing to the world’s merit. While one side considers the market as the creator of the economic 
environment and contends that the government should only regulate competitive surroundings, 
the other side, adopting the Keynesians model, claims that the government should be active in 
the market (Holman, 1999). 
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2.4 Efficiency and effectiveness of investment incentives
Investment incentives are world wide offered. Efficiency (a ratio) concerns the maximum profit 
on the minimum investment, whereas effectiveness does not take the amount of investment into 
account but only the results. 
To display the efficiency, Cheshire and Gordon (1998) found out that the results of competition 
among local governments can have combinations of effects which fit into the following 2-x-2 
matrix. Based on this model, Rodriguez-Pose and Glauco Arbix (2001) suggested an innovative 
model for understanding the impact of investment incentives. It is based on the effect of subsi-
dized investment on local and global efficiency. This model was used in Brazilian auto industry. 
Fig. 1 – The Local vs. Global Efficiency Matrix. Source: Cheshire and Gordon (1998).
According to Fig. 1, if the competitive policy is locally and globally efficient then it enhances the 
growth. Increased economic welfare at the local level is not balanced by negative externalities 
in other parts of the country. However, if the improvements in efficiency at the local level cause 
losses somewhere in the country, they are considered zero-sum. The danger in competitive poli-
cies such as incentives could be in expensiveness of offset of local gains and it could also induce 
negative impacts in other parts of the country. Then the result could be pure waste of resources 
or in other words they are so-called fiscal wars. 
The fourth quadrant stayed empty. It is so called the winners curse. This paradox can occur 
when a local jurisdiction overbids for an investment (they are locally inefficient) and it also hap-
pens to the location where the facility will operate most efficiently (they are globally efficient). 
Shifting an existing facility from a low-unemployment area to a high-unemployment area can be 
used as an example. 
Christiansen, Oman and Charlton (2003) focused on the benefits of incentives against their costs 
and they claim that in some of the recipient states the efficiency gains outweighed the incentive 
costs. They analyzed the case in Brazil and they realized that the relocation of some automotive 
productions from Sao Paul to poorer areas of the country increased national efficiency. 
3. LEGAL PROCESS OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN THE  
CZECH REPUBLIC
After the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the government of the Czech Republic tried to attract for-
eign investors. All neighboring countries introduced systems of investment incentives, thereby 
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increasing their competitiveness not only in a global context but against each other. From 1993 
to 2011, the Czech Republic provided incentives worth 608 billion crowns which should have 
created 139,000 new jobs (Czechinvest, 2012). 
Due to the transformation in the Czech Republic after the Velvet Revolution, it was necessary 
to jumpstart the economy. The government tried to do so through investment incentives. It was 
established The Investment and Business Development Agency - CzechInvest. More precisely, 
CzechInvest is a government agency whose task is to contribute to strengthening the Czech 
economy competitiveness through support for small and medium-sized enterprises, business 
infrastructure and innovation, and by attracting foreign investments in the areas of manufactur-
ing, business support services and technology centres. 
The government’s task was to increase the attractiveness of the Czech economic environment 
for international investors. The acceptance alone of incentives marked a significant change in 
an economic policy previously focused on domestic companies. Incentives were nothing new 
because nearly every developed country in Europe offered them by the end of the 1990s. 
Government decree No 298/98, passed in April 1998, established the conditions for the award-
ing of investment incentives. According to the decree, the investor was obliged to invest a mini-
mum of 25 mil. USD. A subsequent government decree in December of that year reduced this 
amount to 10 mil. USD. Investment incentives were designed as follows: 
financial support for creation of new jobs, 
financial support for training and retraining new employees, 
corporate income tax relief for new companies, 
financial support for new production, 
financial support in case of expansion of production or modernization of production. 
To receive investment incentives, the investor had to apply for them.  
Government decrees defined the investment incentives and how they would be provided, but 
omitted investor obligations. As a result, it became a danger that foreign investors would apply 
for investment incentives, build a factory, use investment incentives and then move production 
to a cheaper country. 
The first law which applied to investment incentives was No 72/2000. This Law about Invest-
ment Incentives took effect May 1, 2000. It was amended on February 24, 2001, and since then 
has provided investment incentives in a “statutory regime”. This law established conditions and 
defined the process and solutions in the case that the conditions are not fulfilled. Its intent was 
to prevent the misuse of investment incentives, and it should assure the efficient distribution of 
public support in the form of investment incentives. 
Law No 72/2000 has been amended six times, the latest amendment occurring in 2012. The 
revised law simplifies the application procedure for investment incentives (Czechinvest, 2012): 
As the law now stands, it provides the following:
corporate income tax relief for new companies for ten years, 
regions A (regions which have an unemployment rate about 50% higher than the average 
unemployment rate in the Czech Republic) can receive material support up to 50,000 CZK 
for the creation of new jobs, 







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material support for retraining employees up to 25 % of the acknowledged costs, 
the minimum of the investment into the property is 50 mil. CZK in regions I (regions with 
the concentrated attention of the government), but a minimum of 25 mil. CZK into new 
machine equipment. In regions II (others regions) the state support is in amount of 100 mil. 
CZK with a minimum of 50 mil. CZK for new machine equipment. 
4. METHODOLOGY
This part will explain how to calculate the effectiveness of investment incentives. At first it is 
necessary to focus on theoretical aspects that influence fiscal (tax) effectiveness, provided invest-
ment incentives are one of the possible kinds of public support offered by the government. 
The government of a country provides investment incentives to an applicant (company). Since 
1998 when the system of investment incentives was approved by the Czech government, for-
eign investors have been eligible for the following support: financial support for creating work 
places, subvention for costs related to retraining employees, income tax relief and subvention for 
supporting the development of an industrial estate. Each company that applies for investment 
incentives receives an official decision concerning their request. 
The government provides a survey on maximum permissible state aid intensity in specific re-
gions. The permissible state aid intensity is increased by 20 % in the case of small enterprises and 
by 10% in the case of medium-sized enterprises. 
In the calculation of the effectiveness of investment incentives from the government’s point 
of view are considered the revenues (inputs) especially taxes, charges, insurance and the public 
health security. Taxes are considered as the yield of income tax resulting from the dependent 
activity of the firm’s employees (15%), the tax yield of the legal entity, and the income tax yield 
collected from the separated tax base special tax rate. Further, tax yields stem from the Vehicle 
Excise Duty, estate duty and various charges. Another source of revenues is insurance on social 
security; an employee pays 6.5% and employer deducts 25% from the employee’s salary. The last 
revenue source is public health security, of which the employee pays 4.5% and employer 9%.    
Tax effectiveness is possible to express as revenues divided by expenditures in the following 
formula devised by Vybíhal (2002):
In the numerator are several variables considered as inputs to the state budget: 
(Tn) yield of income tax of a natural person from the dependent activity, 
(Tw) yield of income tax which is collected from the separated tax base special tax rate,  
        i. e. yield from the withholding tax, 
(Tv) yield from the Vehicle Excise Duty, 
(Te) yield from the estate duty, 
(To) various charges, 
(I ) insurance on social security, 
(H ) public health security, 


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(S) savings on the expenditure side of the state budget, for example savings on the amount 
      of provision in the change of physical person on account of employment,
(TLE) tax yield of the legal entity. 
Outputs in the process of pursuing fiscal (tax) effectiveness (Ef) is the real yield from taxes, al-
ternatively other incomes from the state budget, as the determinative source of the income side 
of the public budgets, in particular considered as the denominator in the equation: 
(Wp) financial support on the created working place (in CZK), 
(Re) subvention for costs related to the retraining of employees, in CZK (other cost for retraining 
which are paid from the public budget), 
(Tr) the amount of income tax relief (in CZK), 
(Di) subvention for support the development of the industrial estate, 
(Tc) administrative costs related to tax collecting. 
Financial support for a newly created working place and subsidizing part of the cost for retrain-
ing are expenses from the point of view of the public budget. Its source lies in the collection of 
taxes and social insurance. The amount of tax relief does not belong to the expenditure part of 
the public budget as the investment incentives should have produced income for the public.
It should be noted that from the methodological point of view the model of the fiscal effective-
ness was modified and there are not included yields of value added tax. In the studied company, 
the export exceeded the import, which influenced the excessive deduction, i. e. that the tax on 
input is higher than the amount of tax in output. 
5. RESULTS
This research was done in 30 companies which received investment incentives in the Czech Re-
public. The observed duration was 5 years since receiving the investment incentives. 
Much scientific research has been done on investment incentives, however there is still no clear 
answer, incorporating all factors, in determining their effectiveness. Agencies which are in-
volved in providing investment incentives hire private auditors to confirm the contribution of 
incentives to the domestic economy or their effectiveness. The biased approach of these auditors 
invites criticism and draws their conclusions into question. However every project is unique and 
the costs which are implemented on them are high. 
Based on economic debates related to investment incentives, sixty companies which received 
investment incentives or were promised investment incentives were contacted. The aim of this 
research is to find out whether the investment incentives are effective. The qualitative research 
is performed on 30 companies that were granted investment incentives in the Czech Republic 
from April 1998 to June 2011.  
Twenty companies decided not to take investment incentives. This information is not revealed on 
the list of companies on the Czechinvest website. Ten companies chose not to cooperate in the 
research.  In all companies, financial directors or the main accountant were contacted and were 
asked if they wish to join to project. After explaining the aim of the research they were asked to 
fill in the table sent to them via email. Tab. 1 provides more details about the researched com-
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panies and the amount of investment incentives they received. Eight companies manufacture 
transport vehicles; six are in engineering; and six in the electronic and electrotechnic industry. 
Tab. 1 – Structure of researched companies. Source: author s´ own research
Number of Researched 
companies
Applicant s´ Country of Origin
Total Investment 
(in mil. CZK)
8 Germany 8,356
6 Japan 6,248
5 Sweden 1,203
4 France 1,7
4 Spain 863
3 Great Britain 678
Total: 30 -- 16,145
Concerning the granted incentives from the 30 observed companies 29 took use of investment 
incentives in taxes; 20 in creating jobs; 13 companies used them for requalification of employees 
and 2 companies received land. None of the researched companies received investment incen-
tives related to infrastructure.
According to the formula (1) in the previous part it was introduced the calculation of tax effec-
tiveness expressed as revenues dividend by expenditures. The results are provided in the Tab. 2. 
Tab. 2 – Effectiveness of investment incentives. Source: author s´ own research
Efficiency Number of Companies
0.00 - 0.49 2
0.50 - 0.99 2
1.00 - 1.49 3
1.50 - 1.99 4
2.00 - 2.49 7
2.50 - 2.99 4
3.00 - 3.49 2
3.50 - 3.99 2
4.00 - 4.99 1
5.00 - 5.99 1
6.00 - 6.99 2
Total 30
It is obvious that four companies out of the thirty have a lower effectiveness than 1. It means 
that the financial support was not returned to the state budget and companies were ineffective. 
To the statistical expression the average value from the 30 companies is 2.586 and the median 
is 2.27. It shows that observed companies are very effective. As remaining twenty-six compa-
nies were effective investments. Highlighted by company with the highest effectiveness of 6.71, 
meaning it was able to provide returns 6.71 times to the state budget. 
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A more detailed analysis will be focused on the most effective company and its contribution to 
the state budget. 
Tab. 3 – Survey on Taxes of the company. Source: author s´ own research
Input 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
Tn 27 396 436 35 087 794 16 225 835 13 515 083 13 683 155 10 0 0
Tw 462 979 12 190 6 160 5 624 3 394 0 
I 9 258 428 13 379 664 14 367 282 15 683 552 16 065 316   
H 3 862 454 5 783 343 6 713 2115 6 856 392 7 091 948 0 0 
Tv 39 275 45 500 50 225 55 200 44 475  
Te 333 255 333 252 144 162 206 125 145 186 1 11 0
To 373 400 924 800 881 000 1 227 600 1 196 400  0 00
TLE 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 208 909 1 315 742 1 081 547 37 549 576 38 229 874 10 01 
(Tn) yield of income tax of a natural person from the dependent activity, 
(Tw) yield of income tax which is collected from the separated tax base special tax rate, i. e. yield 
       from the withholding tax, 
(I ) insurance on social security, 
(H ) public health security, 
(Tv) yield from the Vehicle Excise Duty, 
(Te) yield from the estate duty, 
(To) various charges, 
(TLE) tax yield of the legal entity. 
Tab. 3 demonstrates that income tax of a natural person from the dependent activity is nearly 
105 mil. CZK, the second biggest yield is insurance on social security and public health security 
(98 mil. CZK). The company s´ policy was to increase production and preserve key staff. During 
the twelve years studied, the company became dominant in its field. Retrained employees stayed 
with the company. However, the global economic crisis influenced the company significantly; 
profits decreased and sixty-five employees were made redundant. The question remains if the 
state support was effective enough for the government. According to the financial director, the 
company “was bleeding” but its internal policy was to keep going. In this case, it worked, and the 
company was able to ride out the storm. 
This company received investment incentives in the following forms:
3 mil. CZK for retraining employees, 
12 mil. CZK for creating 70 jobs. 
The total state support was 15 million CZK. 
The effectiveness can be calculated as 105,061,445/15,000,000 = 6.71. It means that the provided 
investment incentives brought a return of 6.71 times the original investment. However this cal-
culation was only for five years during the validity of investment incentives. To calculate just 
effectiveness is not enough. It is necessary to focus on the long-term financial indicators of the 
company. Fig.2 displays the evolution of number of employees, sales and profit enterprise. 


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Fig. 2 – Evolution of the economic performance of the company. Source: author s´ own research
For the government and for regional development it is important to maintain production. The 
financial means are effective if they will be beneficial for both parties. It means that the govern-
ment should receive a return in its investment and the company should be able to stay in the 
country and continue production. 
6. DISCUSSION
As Thomas (2007) explains, nearly every government offers investment incentives. It evokes 
a question how it would be if instead of investment incentives governments lowered taxes as 
Altshuler, Gruberst and Newlon (1998) suggested. It was proved that some countries attracted 
foreign investors even without investment incentives. This act would help every company and 
the results would be controlled. 
It could be agreed with Bartik (1991) that government offers investment incentives for places 
with the greatest need. In the case of the Czech Republic there are special rates for investment 
incentives in regions with the higher unemployment. The question stays if these regions will be 
helped by them for longer time period. 
In this article it was showed that obtained investment incentives are mostly effective. Based on 
the formula and cooperation of companies it was possible to calculate inputs and outputs to the 
state budget. The company with the highest effectiveness influenced the surrounding and region 
because people moved to work there. Foreign investor brought new element to this area which 
can not be calculated.  
In my opinion, if the government assures low taxes and maintains stability in the country, it 
will be favorable for investors without any investment incentives. Even if the research showed 
that investment incentives are effective, there is still no stable control over them. Governments 
should try protecting their economies and try becoming attractive by ensuring good economic 
conditions and avoiding grey economic areas such as tax evasion. In no case investment in-
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centives should pander to foreign investors. For investors the following factors are important: 
economic and political stability, production and work costs, qualified labor force, infrastructure, 
industry tradition, low costs, development of the country (Srholec, 2004). Economic and politi-
cal stability should be a priority for the Czech government so as to assure foreign investment for 
Czech domestic companies. 
The performance of foreign companies, which received investment incentives and are producing 
in the Czech Republic, is high. So as contributions in form of taxes, social and health insurance 
are extensive. However the attention should not be paid only for economic calculations in the 
form of outputs to the state budget but especially in creating new workforces, quality should be 
considered. Becoming an assembly line for multinational corporations is not optimal. 
Nevertheless small companies should be more supported than big multinational corporations, 
especially agriculture and small farms so as to avoid a massive influx from neighboring countries. 
These entrepreneurships could enhance the Czech economy in the sense that these businesses 
can be observed by customers who, knowing the producer origin, will buy its products. Small 
entrepreneurs and if they are successful they can widen its production. However the economic 
climate and political stability is not so good or there are doubts about it. 
7. CONCLUSION
This article was focused on effectiveness of investment incentives in foreign companies located 
in the Czech Republic. The aim of it was to find out if the provided investment incentives are 
effective and if the government receives any fiscal inputs in the form of taxes and other yields. 
The company which showed the highest effectiveness was studied over time. The analyzed re-
sults indicated that mainly it is effective to provide investment incentives. However, it would 
be worthwhile to create any methodology or instrument for analyzing its effectiveness directly 
from its provider - the Ministry of Industry and Development - and observing its contribution 
regularly. 
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